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III.
INTRODUCTION
Nothing in Respondent's Opposition changes Appellants right to the relief requested on
this appeal. The errors leading up to the October 26, 2013 verdict were numerous and resulted in
reversible error. The award against Appellants was unsupported by evidence, not based on proper
legal standards and violated due process oflaw. The verdict on Count II fraud of$17,000 and
$500,000 punitive damages (later reduced to $384,000) (Tr.p.970-971) and on Count III breach of
contract of $111,000 were awarded by a confused jury based on passion and/or prejudice.
At the beginning of this case, there were two plaintiffs and four claims. By the end of the
case, there was one plaintiff and two claims. The jury heard and considered evidence, however,
on four claims and for two plaintiffs (one who failed to show up at trial). The jury was also
allowed to consider evidence on fraud allegations that were never pleaded. The jury heard and
considered evidence on religious beliefs for which no defense was allowed. The jury based a
breach of contract award on numbers not in evidence. The jury based its entire award on
evidence that was inadmissible, irrelevant and highly prejudicial.
Fraud Re Healing
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The judgment for $17,000 in compensatory and $384,000 (originally $500,000) in
punitive damages on Count II against both Appellants was, on its face, resultant from passion and
prejudice. Count II was based, in part, on statements written by Vianna in 1998 detailing her
belief of how God healed her of cancer, which statements were subsequently heard by
Respondents in 2006. It is important to note that THINK was not in existence until 2008 - two
years after the alleged fraudulent statements were made.
The judgment on Count II for fraud and punitive damages was also based, in part, on
statements made by Vianna in 2008 of her belief that God healed her from a coma in Italy. The
judgment also appears to have been based on evidence offered by Respondent to impeach her
own witness regarding Vianna's statement that God healed her grandson's lung, which was never
pleaded as part of Count II.
The lower court and the jury failed to hold Respondent to the law in awarding the
judgment on Count II because the claim for fraud was not based on specifically pleaded claims or
proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court allowed the Respondent to proceed on a
fraud claim and punitive damages without ever defining the precise fraudulent statements. It was
and still is a moving target. The award for punitive damages was based solely on the fraud claim
in Count II. Respondent did not meet her burden for punitive damages either.
Additionally, the trial court allowed the Respondent to proceed on Count II for fraud on
religious beliefs in violation of the law. The trial court also improperly shifted the burden to
Appellants throughout trial to disprove the allegations in Count II instead of requiring
Respondent to prove her case by clear and convincing evidence. This is particularly problematic
when punitive damages were awarded on a claim that was not proven by clear and convincing
Appellant's Reply Brief
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evidence. The burden is even higher for punitive damages. Further, the evidentiary mistakes
were so highly prejudicial that neither Defendant (Vianna or THINK) were given a fair trial or
proper opportunity to defend.
Breach of Contract re Degree
The judgment on Count III for breach of contract for $111,000 was improper because
Respondent did not prove all of the elements to establish a breach of an oral contract. The
evidence at trial showed the Respondent received the benefit of the bargain. She enrolled in and
paid for classes to learn a technique. She received the training for that technique. She received a
certificate or degree for that training. It was called a "Masters" instead of a "Doctorate of
Ministry." That's it. She was awarded $111,000 for a change in a title on a plaque. She was able
to teach and earn money from the minute she finished the training but failed to do so. Those are
not compensable damages.
The evidence admitted at trial showed that Respondent agreed to call the degree or
certificate a "Doctorate of Ministry," which was later changed to a "Masters" certificate. It was
undisputed that THINK was not an accredited university or college and unable to issue PhD's.
No meeting of the minds was established as to the definition of"doctorate." RESPONDENT
argues, disingenuously, that the term "doctorate" meant to her it was an a PhD from an
unaccredited company after a summer of classes totaling $2,300 - making it the easiest and
cheapest PhD in the world to earn. She also asks this court to view her damages as comparable to
the expectation that she would have received had she received a PhD from an accredited
university. She's comparing apples to oranges. A "Doctorate of Ministry" in Theta Healing is not
comparable to a "Doctorate in Theology'' from say Duke University for example. Respondent
Appellant's Reply Brief
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knows that she received the benefit of the bargain regardless of the title of her certificate or
plaque and the jury erred.
The $111,000 damages awarded were the result of pure speculation, inadmissible and
irrelevant evidence and not based on sound legal principals. No evidence was provided in
discovery or to the jury regarding the value of a per se "Doctorate of Ministry" degree from an
third party (accredited university or otherwise). Respondent received a certificate of completion
called a "Masters" instead of a certificate of completion called a "Doctorate." The evidence
offered at trial showed that the title of a "doctorate" in Theta Healing did not change
Respondent's ability to take clients for healing services or teach classes in Theta Healing. An
honorary "doctorate" provided no other benefits to Respondent from which damages could be
based.
The Court's dismissal of Count I re fraud in awarding a "Doctorate of Ministry" degree
and refusal to dismiss Count III based on the same facts establishes the impropriety of the jury's
award. These claims were identical and pleaded in the alternative - one tort and one contract.
There was insufficient evidence on both Counts I and III and both should have been dismissed.
It is clear that the jury's award of $111,000 on Count III was based on clear passion and/or

prejudice because the Court limited the actual damages sustained to those incurred after May of
2008 totaling $2,300 in tuition and $22,862.77 in costs. There is simply no basis in law or equity
for an award five times the amount of actual damages. The $111,000 award is more akin to
punitive damages than contract damages. The judgment on Count III must be reversed.

IV.
ARGUMENT
Appellant's Reply Brief
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A. THE JURY'S DAMAGE AWARD FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT
SHOULD HAVE BEEN VACATED.
1.

There was no basis for damages awarded by the Jury.

Respondent fails to address the fact that damages on Count III are improper in their
entirety because Respondent received a "Masters" degree instead of a "Doctorate in Ministry."
Tr.p.279,L.7-22. Respondent agreed to accept the designation of "Master" of Theta Healing. Tr.
p. 659. Three years after she accepted the "Theta Healing Master" designation, she filed her
lawsuit. She never alleged that she received nothing. She acknowledges that she received a
degree- it was just named something different. She still received the benefit of her bargain. She
signed up for classes. She paid $2,300 for that class. She did not sign up for the class with the
expectation of a "doctorate" degree. That decision to award a title to the certificate or plaque
being offered by THINK came after the class. There was no reliance. Respondent received the
training and a certificate she paid for. There is no basis upon which she can even claim damages
in this case.
The sole issue argued by Respondent was the definition of the word "Doctorate of
Ministry" as opposed to "Masters" in Theta Healing. Respondent failed to prove what part of the
contract she was denied from receiving. Respondent relies on Corder v. State Farmway, 133
Idaho 353 in support of her argument that there was a meeting of the minds in the instant case
that Respondent would be awarded a PhD doctorate degree. R. Brief p. 18. The Corder case is
not analogous to the present case. That case dealt with a written lease agreement that was
performed but never signed. Id. p. 362. The specific agreed-upon terms of the lease were at
issue. There was substantial evidence of a contract given the parties' written document and
Appellant's Reply Brief
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course of performance. There is no written agreement in the present case. There was insufficient
evidence as to a meeting of the minds on the critical definition of what is a "Doctorate of
Ministry" plaque or certificate or degree. There was no credible evidence that it is a PhD from an
accredited university. THINK is a private company. Respondent chose the term "Doctorate of
Ministry" herself.
Respondent and Appellant clearly had very different understandings of what a per se
"doctorate" plaque or award means. Respondent Alexander had two years of classes from 20062008 to investigate and understand what kind of "certificates" or "degrees" were being awarded.
She is an educated plaintiff and has a master's degree from an accredited university. She even
received multiple "certificates" for each of the classes at THINK between 2006-2008. She knew
THINK was not offering PhD's.
Respondent's argument on the award of a "Doctorate of Ministry" further supports
Appellant's argument regarding religious liberties because the word "ministry" is only used for
theology or divinity. It is religious. There is no "Doctorate of Ministry" for scientific degrees. A
"Doctorate of Ministry" is awarded after a course of study in religion.
2. The damage award for $111,000.00 on the Breach of Contract claim was

speculative and uncertain.
The Court limited the actual damages sustained on Count III to those incurred costs
incurred after May of 2008 totaling $2,300 in tuition and $22,862.77 in costs. There is simply no
basis in law or equity for an award of $111,000 - five times the amount of actual damages. This
award is akin to punitive damages and was not based in law or fact.

Expectation damages/lost profits.

Appellant's Reply Brief
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Respondent seemingly relies on Phillips v. Erhart, 151 Idaho 100 (2011) in support of her
argument that the jury's large award was proper expectation damages. R. Brief p.17. She argues
that the jury was free to award approximately $85,000.00 in expectation damages. Id. She offers
no calculation or evidence in support. The issue is really what value the non-breaching party
expected from the contract, i.e., what value did Respondent expect to receive from the change in
the title of the certificate from "doctorate" to "masters." Id. These are very different facts than the
ones set forth in Erhart, which involved a personal injury case with damages for loss of
consortium with a large award. This case is only relevant as far as it cites to general principles on
damage calculations and is not a proper basis to compare a large loss of consortium award to that
of a breach of contract claim with a change in the title of a certificate.
An award for damages may be upheld on appeal only where there is sufficient evidence
supporting the award and the damages were proven to a reasonable certainty. Sells v. Robinson,
141 Idaho 767, 774, 118 P.3d 99, 106 (2005) (citing Bumgarner v. Bumgarner,124 Idaho 629,
641,862 P.2d 321,333 (Ct.App.1993)); Inland Group of Companies v. Providence Washington
Ins. Co., 133 Idaho 249,257, 985 P.2d 674,682 (1999)(citing Hummer v. Evans, 129 Idaho 274,
280,923 P.2d 981,987 (1996)) ("Compensatory damages for lost profits and future earnings must
be shown with a reasonable certainty.").
The expectation damages had to be based on admissible evidence on the underlying
claim. The claim was a breach of contract claim - an oral contract. The evidence showed that
Respondent paid for classes and received a certificate or degree. The title of that degree is the
only issue she has with the breach of contract. She does not allege that she did not receive any
degree. She does not allege she did not take the training for which she paid $2,300 in tuition.
Appellant's Reply Brief
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There was no evidence as to what she could have "expected" to earn with her certificate called a
"Doctorate of Ministry'' as opposed to a "Masters" in Theta Healing.
Respondent did not introduce any evidence on lost profits or future earnings as it related
to a change in title for her plaque. There simply was no evidence from which the jury could base
their award other than pure speculation. Respondent testified she was making $800/day as a
technology consultant. She could earn that anywhere, anytime. She chose not to take clients
while she was on her "personal healing journey." There is no basis in law to hold Appellant's
liable for Respondent's own choices. The argument that the jury was "free to value a doctorate
degree" is wrong. There was no testimony, no expert, no statistics, no charts, no evidence
whatsoever to establish the "value of a doctorate degree" in Theta Healing as opposed to the
"Masters" in Theta Healing that she was awarded.
Respondent points to evidence that a "teacher in Theta Healing would be able to charge
$500.00-$1960.00 per student per class." She is a teacher in Theta Healing. She provides no
evidence that a "Doctorate of Ministry" would have garnered more money per student than the
"Masters" certificate that she received. A teacher is only as good as he/she can teach. An
independent contractor is only as good as they can advertise, market and sell her own services.
As a Theta Healing instructor, Respondent is an independent contractor and a licensee of the
modality. She is responsible for her own business. There was no evidence presented to show that
she was denied students or had to take less money per student as a result of the title of her
certificate.
Respondent's claim that the contract damages were supported by future lost profits was
not proven. Generally, profits which would have been realized if a contract had been performed

Appellant's Reply Brief
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may be recovered as damages for its breach, provided they are susceptible of being ascertained
with reasonable certainty and their loss may reasonably be supposed to have been within
contemplation of defaulting party at time contract was made as a probable result of its breach.
White v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 94, 730 P.2d 1014, Idaho 1986. In this case, the

contract was performed because Respondent still received her degree - it was just called
something else. Respondent voted on the new name of a "Masters" instead of a "Doctorate."
Respondent points to no evidence in support of her argument as to what the Respondent could
make if the "Doctorate of Ministry" degree in Theta Healing had been issued.
The only damages from which the jury could base its $111,000.00 award on Count III was
from testimony offered, over objection, by Respondent as to what she purportedly made on a
daily basis. This evidence was not provided in discovery, it was not provided before trial but was
provided after numerous objections as to the credibility and supportability of this evidence. Lost
wages must be proven with reasonable certainty, not based on hypothetical or speculative proof,
but rather on substantial and competent evidence. Smith v. Mitton, 140 Idaho 893, 104 P.3d at
374. The Court improperly ruled that she could testify without having provided information
contrary to the Court Order and the Appellant could then argue that the damages were
speculative. Tr.p.576 L.21-p. 578 L.25. Respondent's speculation as to her lost wages without
any support was highly prejudicial to the jury.
Lack of causation.
The burden is upon the plaintiff to prove not only that she was injured, but that her injury
was the result of the defendant's breach; both amount and causation must be proven with
reasonable certainty. See Magic Valley Truck Brokers, Inc. v. Meyer, 133 Idaho 110,116,982 P.2d

Appellant's Reply Brief
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945,951 (Ct.App.1999); cf. Gillingham Constr. v. Newby-Wiggins Constr., lnc.,142 Idaho 15, 26,
121 P.3d 946, 957 (2005) (upholding award of damages where plaintiff presented substantial
evidence of causation).
Respondent still cannot point to evidence to support her testimony that she had loss of
income resulting.from the breach of contract totaling $96,000.00. Respondent was certified in
the Theta Healing energy healing modality in 2006 - two years before any alleged promise of a
"doctorate" degree. She took classes for two years and was certified to teach to generate income
from her Theta Healing services. She received the training she paid for and received the
certificate called a "Masters" instead of a "Doctorate in Ministry." Respondent testified she was
earning 1/2 of what she was earning in 2008 by 2013 because she chose her own career path. If a
lawyer leaves a big law firm and joins a small one in the hopes of a better quality of life, he can't
later sue that big law firm for loss of income based upon his own change of career or firm
location.
Respondent did not prove causation. She refused to work. She decided to change careers.
She was certified to teach and decided not to teach. She was certified to be a practitioner in 2006
and chose not to take clients. She chose not to work as an independent contractor during her
classes in 2008 or between 2008 to trial in 2013. There are no grounds for expectation damages,
lost profits or any other damages in this case. There was no calculation presented to the jury as to
the $111,000 award. It was purely speculative and clearly erroneous. The Court failed to rectify
the mistake made by the jury and the claim should be dismissed on appeal.

B.

THE JUDGMENT AWARDING DAMAGES FOR FRAUD AND PUNITIVE
DAMAGES MUST BE REVERSED.

Appellant's Reply Brief
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1.

The Fraud claim should have been dismissed for lack of specificity.

Respondent has no real opposition to the fact that her claims were never pleaded with
specificity. Such an argument is impossible to make based on the record. In ruling on
Appellant's Summary Judgment Motion, the Trial Court held that Respondent had failed to
properly plead Count II (Fraudulent misrepresentations - healing) with specificity. Appellant's
Brief, p. 7 citing to Tr.p.42 (January 17, 2013 Hearing, p. 80:1-6). The Court cautioned counsel
that Respondent must prove the specific fraud and that she relied on the specific representation
and would be prohibited from bringing in evidence of any statements that had nothing to do with
their claims. Id. at p. 45. A Motion in Limine was filed by Appellants' requesting, once again,
that Respondent specify what specific fraudulent misrepresentations were made and the who,
what, when, how and where those were made. A. Brief, p. 7, Tr. p. 37.
Respondent's testimony at trial was that the fraudulent statements were made in 2006 in a
book (first published in 1998) titled "Go Up and Seek God," that contained statements regarding
Vianna's personal journey to God and healing cancer. Tr. p. 227. Her testimony was that reading
this book induced her to take more classes. Id. The other alleged fraudulent statements were
made at some other unspecified time and place and/or she "heard" them from students in class.
Tr. p. 218-220. At trial, the actual text of the book containing the statements was introduced. The
actual statements made in that book were "[i]n August 1995, I was diagnosed with bone cancer;
and it was believed I had a tumor in my right femur. Every test the doctors performed showed
the tumor, and a local bone specialist told me he had only seen two other cases like mine. He told
me that amputation might be my only option if I wanted to life, and even then there was no
guarantee." Tr. p. 438. The same book further detailed Vianna's prayer to God-hence the title
Appellant's Reply Brief
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"Go Up And Seek God" - and how she believes that God healed her leg of cancer. (Exh. 24-25).
These specific alleged fraudulent statements were never made a part of Respondent's pleadings
but introduced at trial as the exact statements of fraud.
Respondent's failure to specifically amend her complaint to allege that the actual
statements in the "Go Up And Seek God" book as the specific fraudulent misrepresentations
should be fatal to her claims. This is the moving target approach of Respondent's trial. She was
not required to specify what the precise fraud was that she was alleging and never specifically
alleged it, even after the opportunity to amend her complaint after trial. She had this information
available to her in 2006 - five years before she filed her lawsuit - so she could have put
Vianna/THINK on notice that the source of the fraudulent misrepresentations and allowed those
claims to actually be subject to the earlier dispositive motions in the trial court.
The trial court erred in denying Appellants' Motion in Limine because Respondent failed
to properly plead her fraud claims with specificity. She was allowed to present facts and
evidence to the jury that had nothing to do with the specific fraud claims, which was highly
prejudicial and confusing to the jury. Appellants' also brought a Motion for Directed Verdict on
the same lack of specificity grounds, and a Motion for New Trial/Remittitur and/or JNOV. The
Trial Court improperly denied each of those motions.

2.

The Fraud claim should be barred by the statute of limitations

Respondent's failure to specifically plead her allegations of fraud make Appellant's claim
that her case is barred by the statute of limitations ripe for decision. A. Brief. p. 44. She failed to
specify when, where, how and to whom the alleged fraudulent statements were made until her
testimony at trial. This defense could not have been raised earlier. It was raised in substance in
Appellant's Reply Brief
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Appellant's prior arguments, although not specifically titled Statute of Limitations. A. Brief, p.
44. A defense barring a claim should be considered by this court as it relates to the lower court's
jurisdiction to hear the claim in the first place.

3.

Respondent's Fraud claim should have been dismissed for lack of
evidence.

Respondent's opposition does not change the fact that she failed to meet her burden on
Count II. The allegations in Count II that were allowed to go to the jury were that Vianna made
representations that: (1) she healed herself of cancer; (2) pulled herself out of a coma in Italy; (3)
healed herself from heart disease; and (4) could make liquids appear in containers." R.Vol.l,p.21
paragraphs 25-28. A fifth claim that "Vianna claims to have healed her grandson's lung" was
introduced as improper impeachment evidence (for Respondent's own witness), never pleaded as
a fraud claim and was improperly argued to the jury as such. Tr.p.235,L.2-7. The Court even
used this evidence in denying the motion for a new trial.
Every element of a fraud claim must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. A.
Brief p. 23. The elements of fraud are (1) a representation of fact; (2) its falsity; (3) its
materiality; (4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity; (5) the speaker's intent that the
representation will be acted upon in a reasonably contemplated manner; (6) the listener's
ignorance of its falsity; (7) the listener's reliance on the truth of the representation; (8) the
listener's right to rely on the truth; (9) the listener's consequent and proximate injury. Galaxy
Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Idaho Transportation Dept., (1985) 109 Idaho 692,696. Fraud

cannot be established on religious based beliefs because it is impossible to prove the truth or
falsity ofreligious based beliefs. A. Brief p. 29. Further, Respondent had no right to rely on
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statements made from religious beliefs. In matters of faith and religion, it is typical for people to
make statements regarding the power of God that are difficult, if not impossible, to prove. They
are also protected free speech.

a.

Fraud Allegation Re Coma In Italy.

Respondent did not meet her burden at trial to prove all of the elements of fraud with
respect to this allegation with clear and convincing evidence. The pleaded allegation was the
Vianna stated she pulled herself out of a coma in Italy in 2008. R. Vo. 1, p. 21; Vol. 2, p. 311.
The actual statement made was that God with the help of her husband and doctors pulled her out
of the coma. Tr. p. 836117-12; p.4281118-12; p. 429; 111-6. Remarkably, the Respondent failed
to provide any evidence as to any sort of statement that was made to her or how she relied on it to
her detriment. Tr. p. 225 11 5-21.
The evidence presented at trial via Guy Stibal was that he saw his wife in a coma in Italy.
Tr. p., 667. He was at the hospital, he held her limp hands, he saw her still body lying on the bed.
Id. The testimony further indicated that Vianna was placed in the infectious disease ward and
was in a coma in the hospital for three days. Tr. p. 667. Vianna testified that she believed the
doctors, Guy's voice and God brought her out of the coma. Tr. p. 836 and 875.
The Court and jury both confused the respective burdens as to the elements of fraud here
because Respondent had the burden to prove every element with clear and convincing evidence.
A. Brief, p. 25. Whether Vianna was in a coma or not is not the sole issue. It's whether Vianna
believed her statements to be true when she made them. Her statements she was in a coma in
Italy and that God helped her out of a coma is true from her perspective. There was no credible
evidence to the contrary.

Appellant's Reply Brief
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Respondent admitted that she did not rely on the statement that Vianna pulled herself out
of a coma in Italy because she testified that: "the coma came at the end. That was not as strong
because I was -- that happened to Vianna in the midst of the period of time that I was taking
classes." Tr. p. 225. Respondent's allegation fails on this element alone because, by her own
admission, the statement did not induce her to take classes or to otherwise act. The evidence
presented at trial showed that Respondent did not prove each element of this claim by clear and
convincing evidence. In addition, there was no evidence presented as to the consequent and
proximate injury relating to how this statement induced Respondent to take any further classes.
The Trial Court's ruling on Appellant's Motion for New Trial shows that Respondent failed
to meet its burden on this claim: "the evidence regarding the coma in Italy is conflicting and the
extent of the coma and how she recovered is also unclear." Respondent cannot meet its burden to
prove this claim by clear and convincing evidence if the "evidence is conflicting and unclear." R.
Vo. III, p. 416. The Court erred and the jury erred.

b.

Fraud Allegation Re Heart Disease.

Respondent alleged that part of her Count II fraud claim involves a statement by Vianna
that she healed herself from heart disease. R. Vo. 1, p. 21; Vol. 2, p. 311. The actual statement
Vianna made was that "God healed my heart disease." Tr. p. 693, 836, 849, 865.
The evidence presented at trial showed that Vianna was diagnosed in 2006 with
"congestive heart failure and diastolic dysfunction according to Dr. Gorman's records" and that
she understood that people can die from this condition. Tr. p. 865. Vianna testified that she
believed the medication and God healed her heart condition. Tr. p. 863-865.
In support of this claim, Respondent relies on the testimony of an oncologist interpreting
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medical records from Vianna's cardiologist from 2006. Dr. Shull did not speak to Vianna's
cardiologist, examine Vianna nor speak to her about her health. Tr. p. 491. The sum total of
evidence provided is as follows:
Q: (BY MR. JOHNSTON): So the last report from Dr. Gorman you saw, she was still
suffering from congestive heart failure?
A: (BY DR. SHULL): Yes.
Tr. p. 4871116-18.
That last report was in 2006. The trial was in 2013. IfVianna was still suffering from
congestive heart failure in 2013, she would be dead. The actual evidence was that Vianna had
congestive heart failure and took medication. She testified that she believed her heart corrected
itself. She said that "the medication became too much for me. It actually shut down my kidneys
and I ended up in the hospital and that's when they realized my heart was completely better... I
have a clean bill of health from Dr. Gorman." Tr. p. 854. There was no evidence to rebut
Vianna's belief that her heart is healed or that God healed it.
Respondent's claim fails for lack of evidence on these elements: (2) there was no false
statement of fact - Vianna had congestive heart failure and she believes it was healed; (4) Vianna
did not know the statement to be false - she was told her heart is in perfect condition now by Dr.
Gorman; (5) Vianna did not contemplate reliance by Respondent on this specific statement to
continue her classes at THINK because she did not make the statement directly to Respondent;
(9) Respondent was not injured as a result of this statement. The Trial Court erred in denying this
claim on all of the motions brought by Appellants, including the Directed Verdict and the Motion
for New Trial/Remittitur/JNOV. This claim should have never been presented to the jury for
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damages because Respondent did not and cannot prove this claim by clear and convincing
evidence.

c.

Fraud Allegation Re Cancer.

Respondent's Brief does not cite to clear and convincing evidence sufficient to prove each
element of on Count II regarding the allegation that Vianna believes God healed her cancer. The
specific allegation made by Respondent in the Complaint was the statement by Vianna that she
healed herself of cancer. R. Vo. 1, p. 21; Vol. 2, p. 311. The actual statement Vianna made was
that God healed her cancer. Tr. p. 693 11 9-11; Tr. p. 836113-6; Tr. p. 84911 14-16, Ex. 24-25.
Vianna testified she wrote her book "Go Up And Seek God" in 1998 which detailed her personal
journey and medical history from her own personal journal that she wrote at the time she was
going through her cancer ordeal. Tr. 869-870. In essence, she wrote the book from her diary and
was sued for fraud because someone read that diary. Id. At the time she wrote the book, there
was no THINK and there were no classes offered to anyone. It was just a book.
Respondent's Brief does not offer any dispute of what the medical records established at
trial: Vianna had a 9-inch tumor in the bone in her leg with "cancer cells" in the tumor. Tr. p.
492, LI 1-24; Tr. 496, 11 15-23. The medical records contained words like "sarcoma,"
"lymphoma," "malignant." The evidence established that Vianna was told that she needed
chemotherapy, radiation and/or amputation to save herlife. Tr.p. 785,L.6-20.; 837, L.1-p. 839,
L.9. 840, L.6-21; 841, L.2-20, 795,L.22-p.796,L.10; 795,L.22-p.797,L.l 7; 847, L.5-21; Tr.p.588,
L.5-18. Both experts testified that her belief that she had cancer was reasonable. Tr. p. 492, 11 1124; Tr. 496, 11 15-23. The statement that "In August 1995, I was diagnosed with bone cancer"
was true from Vianna's perspective. She lived through a terrible ordeal. Tr. p. 593 11 1-4. The
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statement that "I had cancer" and/or "I was diagnosed with cancer" is the same statement to a lay
person. These facts cause Respondent's fraud claim fail as a matter oflaw.
Contrary to Respondent's incomplete recitation of the record regarding the testimony of
Blake McDaniel (R. Briefp. 26), Vianna's ex-husband, Blake McDaniel, actually testified that
Vianna's doctors told both of them that they found "dead cancer cells" in her biopsy. Tr. p. 588 II
16-18. Blake McDaniel testified that the doctor's told Vianna it was "some type of cancer based
on what they think is going on." Tr. p. 588 II 23-25. He told the jury that a second biopsy was
recommended. Tr. p. 588 II 16-18. The jury is required to draw all reasonable inferences from
the evidence. There is only one answer as to why doctor's who find dead cancer cells recommend
a second biopsy, or chemotherapy, or suggest amputation or radiation - the patient has cancer.
Common sense dictates that the finding of dead cancer cells in a 9-inch tumor means there
are live ones elsewhere in the tumor or body. Those are the reasonable inferences required of the
jury. Common sense further dictates that no husband in his right mind would tell a child their
mom will die based on a "cancer scare" but an actual diagnosis. The key point here is the effect
on the listeners-laypeople hearing that there are dead cancer cells, sarcoma, lymphoma,
malignant clearly would lead one to believe that they had cancer or were "diagnosed" with
cancer. Tr. p. 691 II 7-9. The evidence established that Vianna, Blake and their children believed
she would die from her cancer. Id.
Nothing in Respondent's Brief changes the fact that Vianna had a 9-inch tumor and it was
healed without significant medical treatment. The evidence at trial showed that Vianna believed
that God healed her leg when she prayed to him and went into her meditation. That is a belief
protected under the U.S. Constitution and cannot be tried in a court oflaw by a judge or jury (as
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set forth in Appellant's Opening Brief). No judge or jury can prove the existence of God or of a
miracle. Vianna's beliefs in God cannot be the basis for a fraud claim. A. Brief p. 31. This is
part and parcel the reason for the protections on freedom ofreligion and freedom of speech.
In sum, Respondent's Brief does not cite to clear and convincing evidence on the
allegations of fraud that "Vianna healed herself of cancer, i.e., God healed her cancer" and this
claim still fails as a matter oflaw because there was insufficient evidence on elements: (2) no
false statement of fact because Vianna believed she was diagnosed with cancer; (3) not material
to Respondent's decisions to take classes because the statement was made in 1998 and again in
2006 after Respondent was already in class; (4) Vianna did not know the statement was false
because she believed it was true; (5) Vianna did not contemplate reliance by Respondent on the
statement to continue her classes at THINK because Vianna did not make the statement directly
to Respondent; (8) Respondent did not have a right to rely on the statement because she is an
educated person and had three years during her classes to see decide for herself whether to
continue to take classes based on the statements; (8A) Respondent did not have a right to rely on
the statements because they are based in faith and a believe that God can heal others; and (9)
Respondent was not injured as a result of this statement because she failed to prove damages and
causation.

d.

Fraud Allegation Re Liquids.

This claim should have been dismissed on Directed Verdict. The allegation in the
Complaint was the statement that Vianna can make liquids appear in containers. R. Vo. 1, p. 21;
Vol. 2, p. 311. The actual statement was that God can make liquids appear. She could have just
said that she believes God parted the Red Sea for Jesus. It's a similar belief and it's religious.
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Evidence was excluded on both sides. There was no evidence presented on this claim. This was
highly prejudicial to the jury because it was not stricken and the jury could have very well made
the entire decision on fraud based on this as Respondent even points out in her brief.
e.

Evidence regarding Grandson's lung was improperly
characterized and relied upon as a separate Fraud
claim.

Neither the Complaint nor the Amended Complaint contained the allegation that Vianna
represented that she healed her grandson's lung problem. (See, e.g., R. Vo. 1, p. 21; Vol. 2, p.
311 ). This allegation also was not mentioned as part of the Complaint or having anything to do
with it at any point prior to trial. The Court specifically stated "what you can't do is bring in
claims that you have learned that had absolutely nothing to do with your client's claims." Tr. p.
451111-13.
This evidence was inappropriately allowed in evidence as "impeachment" evidence only
and not a claim for fraud - Mr. Johnson: "it is offered to impeach that testimony that she never
actually treated him." Tr. p.520119-16. This was not even proper impeachment evidence
because Vianna never made this statement or claim in her testimony. He was introducing this
evidence to bolster his own witness (which is not impeachment). Respondent's Brief alleges that
this issue was not previously raised by the Appellant. This issue was argued, however, on p. 29
of the Appellant's Appeal Brief, so Respondent's argument is simply false.
The entirety of evidence on this claim was referenced vaguely in Respondent Alexander
testimony: "Vianna's grandson was hospitalized with a serious pulmonary issue and Vianna said
she worked on him and his lungs were perfect." Tr. p. 235 11 2-7. Lindsay Stock, Vianna's exAppellant's Reply Brief
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daughter in law, then testified as to the efficacy of theta healing for her grandson, which was
excluded in the Court's order but considered by the jury. Tr. p. 559112-25; 560; 561 111-11.
There was no evidence submitted that the statement was made directly to Respondent, no
evidence was made that the statement was made with the intent to induce Respondent to take
classes at THINK. The Trial Court was confused as to this evidence as well because the Court
erroneously considered it as a "fraud allegation" in denying Appellant's Motion for New Trial. R.
Vol. 3, p. 416. The Trial Court actually relied on an unpleaded allegation that it allowed in as
only impeachment evidence as another whole entire fraud claim. This illustrates the confusion by
the judge and jury as to what the scope of the actual claims brought by Respondent.
4.

Punitive Damages were improper.

A fundamental error of law was made when the trial court granted the second motion for
punitive damages and allowed the jury to make such an award. The Appellants' initial brief sets
forth the standards for allowing punitive damages. The Appellant argued in that initial brief that
the motion for a punitive amendment should have been denied as it was months earlier, that the
Trial Court should have granted the Motion for New Trial on the issue of punitive damages and;
the Trial Court failed to properly reduce the amount. The Respondent raises no new issues to
address except on the issue of punitive calculation.
In the Response Brief at page 45, the Respondent says that "$384,000.00 is a modest sum
to protect this interest." The interest referred to is the State of Idaho's interest. The issue most
concerning to the Appellant is how the Trial Court determined that $384,000.00 was the proper
amount to award. The Court merely multiplied the award of economic damages on all claims by
three (3) and came up with the number. R. Vo. 3, p. 419. This was a statutory adjustment without
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any analysis into what the proper award should be.
As stated-punitive damages should never have been considered but, assuming arguendo,
there was a basis for punitive damages, it was still erroneously awarded:
·The Court did not analyze the amount versus the conduct. He merely multiplied special
damages by three (3). A Brief p. 32-34;
·The Court relied on contract damages. It was the Court's previous order that punitive
damages would only be heard with respect to the fraud claim. Tr. p. 13 11 7-11. Both the
Court and counsel agree that punitive damages are only being considered with respect to
the fraud allegations not the contract claim. As this is the case, the contract damage
cannot be used as a variable in determining the punitive damage amount. The fraud
damages were $17,000. The award of$384,000 was an error oflaw.
The Respondent fails to analyze or address these fundamental mistakes made by the trial court
and instead relies on general arguments on contract damages. The law governing damages is
ignored by the Respondent and unfortunately it was ignored by the trial court as well.

C.

THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY EXCLUDED EVIDENCE CAUSING
UNFAIR PREJUDICE TO THE APPELLANTS.

The Court very clearly held that:
"it has never been my position in trying this case that the believability in the general
sense of the Defendant, Ms. Stibal, whether or not she is a successful healer or not, is the issue of
this case. That she is or is not is not the issue of this case." The specific statements that she has
made upon which your client has claimed reliance and now claims damage are an issue in the
case as to whether or not those statements were made and whether or not those statements were
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true. But whether or not she may or may not have healed others and whether or not she could
perform a healing here in the courtroom, I had already indicated, I would not allow." Tr. p. 650 11
1-11.
The judge stated in his order that "the efficacy of Theta Healing was not on trial in this
case." However, the story about the grandson's lung put on trial the "efficacy of theta healing."
The claims of fraud involved the "efficacy of theta healing," i.e., Vianna healed herself of cancer,
Vianna healed herself of heart disease, Vianna brought herself out of a coma. All of those
allegations directly involve the efficacy of Theta Healing because that is how she claims to have
healed herself in conjunction with the doctors and her faith and prayers to God. Respondents
were allowed to present evidence (as noted above) on the "efficacy of theta healing" and yet
Appellant's were not allowed to present any evidence in defense of these claims re the "efficacy
of theta healing." Appellant had witnesses lined up to testify that they were healed by Vianna's
Theta Healing techniques but the Court disallowed this testimony. This refusal to allow
Vianna/THINK to defend against the allegations was highly prejudicial and confusing to the jury.
The confusion is further evidenced in the Trial Court's ruling on the Motion for New Trial and
motion for JNOV. R. Vol. 3, p. 416.
In paragraph 31 of the Complaint, Respondent alleges that Vianna did not heal herself, did
not have the ability to heal others, and that her stories were false. R. Vol. 1, p. 22. Respondent
was allowed to introduce evidence to support this claim, but Appellant was not allowed to have
any witnesses to testify on her behalf that Theta Healing was a good effective practice. The Trial
Court's refusal to allow this testimony was extremely prejudicial.

D.

A FUNDAMENTAL ERROR OF LAW WAS MADE IN ALLOWING THE
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ISSUE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES TO GO TO THE JURY.
Respondent's brief fails to accurately oppose the issue ofreligious beliefs. The issue of
religious beliefs was adequately raised in the lower court. Count II for fraud was based on the
statements that "God healed me." Count III for breach of contract involves a claim over a
"Doctorate of Ministry" plaque. The entire case is based on Vianna's religious beliefs and her
religious teachings. Theta Healing is a meditation technique developed by Vianna to allow others
to connect with God. Her books are titled "Go Up and Seek God." The word "God" was
mentioned on at least 49 pages of the record. Tr. pp. 10, 21, 22, 31, 44, 65, 115, 160, 162, 164,

166,197,226,230,403,429,431,432,434,435,438,439,440,441,443,444,445,570,693,
724,829,830,831,833,836,839,844,849,850,861,865,866,874,875,922,944,948,949,
950. Appellant properly raised the issue of religious liberty in the court below multiple times and
was denied consideration of this issue. In fact, her religious beliefs were put on trial and
erroneously decided by the jury. Punitive damages were awarded due to her free exercise of her
right to free speech and free exercise ofreligious beliefs. This issue is ripe and timely and should
properly be decided on appeal.
In denying the initial motion for punitive damages, Judge Watkins stated that "[t]he Court
believes that going into the program, everyone admits that Theta Healing is a religion and with
the elements of personal faith ... so the Court is uncomfortable in granting leave to amend to
include punitive damages." (Judge Watkins Hearing on SMJ/Status Conference p. 99: 11-14).
Judge Watkins also ruled that "if faith is part of the program or teachings, and the Plaintiffs
concede that, then it makes the task of establishing an extremely harmful state of mind extremely
difficult." Appellants Brief, p. 30.
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Respondent's contention that this Court cannot consider the issue of religious liberty is
misplaced. The cases cited by Respondent in support of her argument are not persuasive. First,
the court in Gardner v. Bartshi, 139 Idaho 430, 436 found that "Bartschi also contends that the
Court should not address this issue [i.e. statute of frauds defense] as it was not raised before the
district court. However, after a review of the record, it appears that Garner and Flinders Realty
did raise this issue arguing that either estoppel or quasi-estoppel should be used to avoid the
unjust results of the statute of frauds in their supplemental briefing before the district court." The
issue was argued in principle and raised adequately just like the present case. A. Brief_.
Respondent's argument that the "exception of fundamental error only applies to criminal
and quasi-criminal cases" is simply wrong. R. Brief, p. 12. If the Court accepted Respondent's
own misinterpretation of the law, it would mean that no constitutional rights would exist for any
civil litigants. The U.S. constitution covers all litigants - whether civil or criminal. The definition
of "fundamental error" was taken from criminal cases but the case does not state that it "only
applies to criminal cases" or that it cannot be used in civil cases where religious liberties are at
issue. In fact, the Court in State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 534, found that the exceptions to the rule that
"[g]enerally the Court will not consider on appeal any issues that are not raised by the parties"
may be applied for "certain issues in certain types of cases. 11 Id. at *536;Crane Creek Country
Club v. City ofBoise, 121 Idaho 485,487,826 P.2d 446,448 (1990)(Bakes, C.J., specially

concurring) (an issue not raised in the trial court or on appeal may be addressed when plain or
fundamental error exists). Crane Creek Country Club is a civil case and not a criminal one.
Fundamental error is error which "so profoundly distorts the trial that it produces manifest
injustice and deprives the accused of his constitutional right to due process." State v. Sheahan,
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139 Idaho 267, 281, 77 P.3d 956, 970 (2003). The Court in State v. Doe, supra, found that
"[w]hile this is not a criminal case, the magistrate court's error in applying the incorrect standard
affects Doe's fundamental right to raise his own child and violates the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." The same is true in Appellant's case - she was denied her fundamental
rights to her own free exercise of religious beliefs and free speech and denied the opportunity to
defend the claims made against her. Respondent further claims that "the ruling from In Re Doe,
330 P.3d 1040, appears to overturn the Court's ruling in State v. Doe upon which Appellant's
rely." R. Brief p. 12. When cite checking this case at the time of this Reply, there is no "negative
history" for State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 534 and the In Re Doe case is not reported on Westlaw.
As stated in Appellant's Brief, forcing a person to prove or disprove the existence of God
and/or that God heals people violated Appellant's constitutional rights and rights of due process
of law. This certainly rises to the level of error in State v. Doe that "so profoundly distort the trial
that it produces manifest injustice and deprives the accused of his constitutional right to due
process." It also sets a dangerous legal precedent in Idaho if allowed to remain.
The Courts may not consider whether the party's purportedly religious beliefs are true or false.
State v. Cordingly (Idaho 2013) 302 P. 3d 730.

Contrary to Respondent's arguments, the Idaho Code does not require Theta Healing to be
a 501(c)(3) for tax purposes in order to obtain protection under the FERPA. Idaho Code Section
73-401(2). In addition, Respondent's argument that Theta Healing cannot be a religion because
it's also based in science is equally flawed. There are a number of per se religions that are based
in scientific principles without any deity at all. A. Brief p. 29.
Respondent attempts to argue the Meyer's factors is misplaced. All of the evidence cited
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by Respondent on P. 32 of its brief were evidenced in Vianna's book "Go Up and Seek God" and
her subsequent books that are part of the evidence. The videos and other brochures that were
admitted into evidence establish a prayer before and after each class session and meet the 1\1eyers
test. The meditation technique itself is focused prayer to God. The problem with the argument
under the Meyers test is that Appellant was denied the opportunity to have a fair hearing under
Meyers. The second punitive damages motion was granted the day before trial. The Court

denied Appellant's any further argument on religious grounds.
Accordingly, the issue of religious beliefs was properly raised in the trial court. "To
properly raise an issue on appeal there must either be an adverse ruling by the court below or the
issue must have been raised in the court below, [sic] an issue cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal." Garner v. Bartschi,139 Idaho 430,436, 80 P.3d 1031, 1037 (2003) (citingMcPheters v.
Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 397, 64 P.3d 317, 323 (2003)). Under I.R.C.P. 59(a)(5), a trial court may

grant a new trial for "excessive damages or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given
under the influence of passion or prejudice." I.R.C.P. 59(a)(5). Clearly an award of $500,000 by
the jury (later reduced to $384,000) in punitive damages was excessive and awarded under the
influence of passion or prejudice. There is absolutely no correlation between $17,000 and
$500,000. The award was unconstitutional, erroneous and must be reversed.

V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the case should be dismissed for the reasons cited in
Appellant's Opening Brief and herein and the requested relief granted to Appellants or as this
court deems just and proper.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 'ZZ..day of December, 2014.

Dennis P. Wilkinson, ESQ.
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL, HAND DELIVERY
OR FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was on this
date served upon the person named below, at the addresses set out below his name, either by
mailing, hand delivery or by telecopying to him a true and correct copy of said document in a
properly addressed envelope in the United States mail, postage prepaid; by hand delivery to him;
or by facsimile transmission.
DATED this .zk_ day of December, 2014.

~~
Dennis P. Wilkinson

Alan Johnston
Pike Herndon Stosich
PO Box 2949
Idaho Falls, ID 83403-2949
Fax: (208) 528-6447
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